Peace Process Pathologies: A Comparative Analysis of the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish Peace Processes by Weiss, Matthew
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Public Affairs and Security Studies Faculty 
Publications and Presentations College of Liberal Arts 
Fall 2018 
Peace Process Pathologies: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish Peace 
Processes 
Matthew Weiss 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/pass_fac 
 Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weiss, Matthew. 2018. “Peace Process Pathologies: A Comparative Analysis of the Breakdown of the 
Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish Peace Processes.” NETSOL: New Trends in Social and Liberal 
Sciences 3 (2): 22–51. https://doi.org/10.24819/netsol2018.06. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Public Affairs and Security Studies Faculty Publications and Presentations by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, 
william.flores01@utrgv.edu. 
 
An Interdisciplinary Journal 
http://www.netsoljournal.net/  
Volume 3, Issue 2, pp.22-51, Fall 2018 
https://doi.org/10.24819/netsol2018.06 





Peace Process Pathologies: A Comparative Analysis of the Breakdown 
of the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish Peace Processes 
Matthew Weiss 
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Abstract 
Despite the significant differences between the issues under contention, the Oslo peace process 
between Israel and the Palestinians and the “solution process” between Turkey and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) were plagued by common dysfunctions that militated against their success. 
A comparative investigation points to several salient common denominators that rendered both 
peace processes susceptible to collapse, including the inadequate identification of the end goals of 
negotiations by the conflicting parties, mistrust and societal polarization. Over-reaching security 
measures enacted by the stronger side in each conflict (Israel and Turkey) that stifled freedom of 
expression, conflated lawful dissent with criminality, tended towards collective punishment and 
undermined the ability of the weaker parties to organize in the political arena and negotiate 
effectively also contributed to the breakdown of negotiations. Systematic analysis of these peace 
process pathologies will suggest critical “lessons learned” from which fellow researchers and 
policymakers can glean valuable insights. 
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The Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish peace processes have been among the most 
intractable and longest-lasting of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It almost defies reason 
why this pair of conflicts have been seemingly so unamenable to resolution when other identity-
based conflicts, such as the Northern Ireland conflict and the struggle against apartheid in South 
Africa, were resolved some decades ago. More puzzling is the fact that some of the prerequisites 
for a comprehensive resolution have been in place at various times, albeit in different ways, in 
each of these conflicts. 
For one, there have been several times in the trajectory of each conflict whereby although 




stalemate, a situation whereby a unilateral military escalation to victory is deemed either 
impossible or prohibitively painful.1 For instance, some in Israeli security circles have taken to 
framing Israel’s dominant military strategy against Hamas as tantamount to “mowing the grass”. 
This refers to a strategy of Israel invading the Gaza Strip periodically with the aims of reducing 
Hamas’ capabilities to more manageable proportions and restoring deterrence, a tacit 
acknowledgement that Hamas cannot be defeated at an acceptable price, if at all.2 
 Furthermore, each conflict witnessed periods where the conflicting parties’ positions on 
sensitive issues or the parameters of an acceptable settlement converged to the point that a 
negotiated agreement appeared within reach. This was most manifest in the negotiations that took 
place in Taba, Egypt between representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in January 
2001and to a lesser extent with the secret Oslo talks conducted between the Turkish national 
intelligence agency (the ‘MİT’) and the PKK (Partiya Kerkeren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers’ 
Party) from 2006 to 2011. However, in neither case was the substantial progress made towards 
arriving at a formula or shared principles for conflict resolution adequate to prevent the renewal 
of a cycle of violence. In fact, some of the most intense periods of violence transpired in the wake 
of these promising yet ultimately unsuccessful negotiations. 
With these striking similarities in conflict patterns in mind, this paper is designed to provide 
a comparative perspective on the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish peace 
processes. One focal point of the investigation revolves around the structural features and 
components of the peace negotiations that have militated against success. At the same time, equal 
weight is accorded to relational and psychological factors, which it is argued, have served as 
formidable obstacles to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, even when there has been a 
significant lull in hostilities between the protagonists and the environment has been otherwise ripe 
for conflict resolution. In this context, the debilitating impact of mistrust and the growing animus 
between Israelis and Palestinians and Turks and Kurds at the societal level are examined, among 
other factors. 
 While this paper stresses the common denominators between the two cases, there are 
pronounced differences in the disparate structural positions of the weaker parties in each conflict. 
Though there are sharp disparities in relative power (military and otherwise) between the majority 
and minority ethnic groups in each conflict, the asymmetries in each conflict are not structurally 
equivalent. Undeniably, Turkish Kurds suffer from some of the same onerous military measures 
and restrictions (e.g., curfews) as their Palestinian counterparts. Moreover, both minority groups 
have experienced widespread property destruction and displacement as a result of repeated large-
scale military operations carried out by the strong state in each conflict. However, Palestinians 
arguably confront greater structural disadvantages than their Kurdish counterparts, stemming from 
the over half-century-old Israeli military occupation of the predominantly Palestinian areas of East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the Kurdish provinces of southeastern Turkey 
                                                          
1 Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives.” 
2 Inbar and Shamir, “Mowing the Grass in Gaza”; International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 
18. With respect to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, according to the 2014 ICG report titled, “Turkey and the 
PKK: Saving the Peace Process”, Turkish officials have acknowledged that “military victory has evaded 




have long suffered from chronic under-development and neglect by the central government, 
Turkey’s Kurds do not labor under the same ethnocratic system of settler colonialism and separate 
but unequal access to land, resources and infrastructure that Palestinians do under Israeli military 
rule. 
The bargaining power of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel is also somewhat weaker than that 
of the Kurds vis-à-vis Turkey. This is due to the territorial fragmentation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and the longstanding rift between the Palestinian Authority (dominated by the Fatah 
movement and President Mahmoud Abbas) and Hamas, both of whom portray themselves as the 
legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Not only do Fatah and Hamas remain as deeply 
divided as ever along ideological lines, but they are diametrically opposed on the fundamental 
question of recognizing and making peace with Israel, with Hamas refusing to endorse any solution 
that would legitimize Israeli sovereignty over any portion of historic Palestine. On the other hand, 
in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the main actors on the Kurdish side, represented by the PKK and 
the KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Communities’ Union) are viewed by a wide 
cross-section of Turkish Kurds as the legitimate representatives of the Kurdish national movement. 
The high esteem which the PKK enjoys in the eyes of the public is overwhelmingly a byproduct 
of the charismatic authority of the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. 
However, the differences in the relative cohesion of each non-state actor should not be 
overstated. On the Palestinian side, when the crucial Oslo negotiations that are analyzed in this 
article were commenced in 1993, the late Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chief and 
subsequently, president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Yasser Arafat, enjoyed strong 
legitimacy akin to Öcalan’s status among the Kurds by virtue of his charismatic authority and 
guidance of the Palestinian armed struggle from the outset. At the same time, the PKK has nothing 
approaching a monopoly of representation on Turkey’s Kurdish population. More conservative 
Kurdish voters tend to gravitate towards center-right Turkish parties, such as the AKP and its 
Islamist predecessors. Moreover, there are various independent Kurdish and anti-PKK factions 
(e.g., Kemal Burkay’s Rights and Freedoms Party, or ‘HAK-PAR’) that embrace Kurdish 
movement demands, such as full mother-tongue language rights and regional autonomy yet view 
the PKK’s ideological rigidity, draconian methods for suppression of dissent, and the cult of 
personality surrounding Öcalan as inherently incompatible with the democratic solution to the 
Kurdish problem they desire. 
Nonetheless, the observation regarding the differences in the relative strength and cohesion 
between the two ethnic groups remains valid, as a strong case can be made that the Turkish Kurds 
represent a more united front than the Palestinians overall. In the Palestinian camp, Arafat’s 
popularity waned as Arafat and the PA came to be identified by many Palestinians with the 
shortcomings of the Oslo Accords and its implementation, especially its failure to improve the 
depressed economic conditions of ordinary Palestinians, while Mahmoud Abbas has never inspired 
the same loyalty as his predecessor Arafat. In contrast, even figures, factions and branches within 
the Kurdish national movement who have occasional misgivings about decisions made by Öcalan 
tend to defer to him, such that it is highly likely that Öcalan and the PKK could deliver both the 




grassroots movement supporters engaged in peaceful civil society activities in Turkey into a peace 
agreement.3 
On the other hand, in the Palestinian camp, Fatah and Hamas can each at best lay claim to 
a third of the allegiances of the Palestinian people resident within the Occupied Territories.4 
Furthermore, the chasm that separates the two parties on “final status” issues is so vast that unless 
Hamas’ own base in the Gaza Strip could be sold on the merits of a peace agreement with Israel, 
it is difficult to envision that any agreement negotiated by Fatah/the Palestinian Authority would 
win Hamas’ unqualified endorsement.5 These are among the differences that make the Kurdish 
negotiating position vis-à-vis Turkey at least marginally stronger than the Palestinian negotiating 
position vis-à-vis Israel. 
Nonetheless, as significant as these differences may be, exploring the similarities of the 
two cases, both of which can be defined as protracted conflicts or “enduring rivalries”6, is still a 
worthwhile exercise from the standpoint of both theory and policy development. Detailed 
comparative investigation of both cases can yield important insights into the impact of flaws in the 
structural design of negotiating frameworks (especially the inadequate identification of end goals), 
mistrust, societal polarization and structural disparities on failed peace processes. These processes 
will be illuminated in the sections that follow. 
                                                          
3 ICG Europe Report No. 234, 10-11. As the ICG report aptly states concerning Ocalan’s unmatched moral 
authority and stature in the eyes of Turkish Kurdish activists: “One lesson of the past fifteen years of 
imprisonment is that Turkey’s Kurdish national movement regards him as the only leader – embodying “the 
will of the Kurdish people” – who can unify and bless a compromise for peace. Most lasting initiatives of 
the Kurdish national movement only happen with his approval. The final instruction to lay down weapons 
has to come from him.” 
4 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Public Opinion Poll No (67) Press-Release.” 
According to a poll taken in March 2018 by one of the most authoritative Palestinian pollsters Khalil 
Shikaki, 31% of likely Palestinian voters who reside in the Occupied Territories said they would support 
Hamas and 36% said they would support Fatah in future elections, hardly a ringing endorsement of either 
party. Especially telling is the abysmally low levels of reported support for President Abbas of the 
Palestinian Authority, with 68% of the Palestinian public expressing a desire for him to resign. Even in the 
West Bank, Abbas’ and Fatah’s nominal power base, only 40% of respondents expressed satisfaction with 
his performance.  
5 Tahhan, “Hamas and Fatah.” Recent developments, however, suggest that Hamas may not be implacably 
opposed to a peace agreement with Israel as it once was, and the distance between its position and Fatah/the 
Palestinian Authority’s position has narrowed. Specifically, in 2017, it revised its charter to state that while 
“Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea”, it 
would accept the creation of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders (i.e., the East Jerusalem, West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, and excluding the remainder of “historic” or “mandatory” Palestine). The recent change of 
tone, though far being a ringing endorsement of territorial compromise, may be interpreted as being in 
alignment with several past statements by Hamas leaders, including the former head of the political bureau, 
Khaled Mashaal, that Hamas would not stand in the way of an agreement negotiated by the Palestinian 
leadership to establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, provided it was approved in a popular 
Palestinian referendum.  




Structural Flaws in the Negotiating Processes and Frameworks 
 In both the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish cases, one of the most fundamental 
deficiencies in the structure of negotiations has been the fact that the end goals of the process have 
been ill-defined and not explicitly articulated, partly due to disagreement among the protagonists 
over their substance. In the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the entire framework supporting negotiations 
has remained rather rudimentary, as described aptly in the 2014 ICG report titled, “Turkey and the 
PKK: Saving the Peace Process”: 
Just as there is no agreed phrase to describe the talks, the peace process also lacks a 
mutually agreed agenda, timeframe and means for engagement. It has only begun 
establishing a framework and ground rules. Constantly changing, neither side has fully 
committed to the few parameters already in place. A senior government security official 
described “a very flexible process”, less a plan than an avalanche of ad hoc initiatives.7 
One of the most persistent problems in this respect is the absence of specific and agreed-upon 
objectives. 
It is widely understood that the core of a durable and sustainable settlement will involve 
the PKK disarming and demobilizing in exchange for the Turkish government offering assurances 
that Kurdish parties and candidates, both within and outside of the PKK umbrella, will be able to 
compete in election and operate on a level playing field, free from the threat of legal harassment 
or closure, the abolition of remaining restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language, and some 
measure of administrative and fiscal decentralization. However, this ‘grand bargain’, the sine qua 
non of any workable agreement, has never been formalized or made explicit in any negotiations 
between representatives of the Turkish government and Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the 
PKK, and his intermediaries. In 2013, both sides agreed to a three-stage road map which involved 
the PKK initiating a ceasefire and withdrawing its armed insurgents from Turkish territory, the 
government’s enactment of legal and constitutional reforms to expand Kurdish cultural and 
political rights, and the complete disarmament and demobilization of the PKK. However, the 
implementation got bogged down in disagreements over the sequencing of these steps, leading the 
PKK to suspend the process of pulling their forces out of Turkish territory.8 
Beyond the fact that each side’s desired end-goals have only been minimally addressed in 
the negotiations, there was a substantial ambiguity surrounding how those goals were to be 
fulfilled. Both the PKK as well as Kurdish political parties that oppose the PKK (e.g., Kemal 
Burkay’s Rights and Freedoms Party ‘HAK-PAR’) have espoused empowerment of local 
administrations or greater autonomy as a core element of a settlement package since the early 
2000s.9 The PKK has initially promoted a secessionist and irredentist project involving the 
formation of a greater, independent Kurdistan that would unify the neighboring Kurdish-majority 
regions of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, comprising 25 million Kurds in total under one political 
roof. The PKK discarded this objective in the mid-1990s in favor of a federal structure closely 
                                                          
7 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 4.  
8 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 219, 4. Then-Turkish Prime Minister (and currently 
President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reportedly refused to endorse an earlier roadmap in 2011 that his own 
negotiating delegation found reasonable.  




resembling the arrangements established by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 
northern Iraq.10 
From 2001 forward, the more modest objective of securing a high level of autonomy for 
the Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey gained ground. This shift can be partly 
attributed to Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate for membership in the European Union in 1999.11 
Both respect for and protection of minorities and the concept of self-government at the local level 
are deeply ingrained as core values in the EU Accession Criteria. Therefore, under the pressure of 
fulfilling the exacting requirements for EU membership, Turkey had a strong incentive to concede 
a greater measure of autonomy to Kurdish-majority regions. 
However, Turkey’s approach towards the European Charter on Local Self-Government, 
which embodies the EU norm of decentralized governance, was arguably ambivalent at best. While 
the AKP government expressed support in its party platform for enhancing the financial autonomy 
of local governments and enshrining the right to local governance in its constitution, in practice, it 
placed reservations on several key articles of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, 
such as involving local authorities in the central decision-making process and granting them 
greater access to financial resources and assets.12 To push back against what it regarded as a half-
hearted Turkish government commitment to decentralization, the Kurdish national movement 
leaned on the charter to build international pressure on Turkey to lift these reservations and transfer 
greater responsibilities and decision-making powers to Kurdish municipalities.13 The Kurdish 
movement’s adept use of EU conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey to enhance its leverage over the latter 
and secure a greater measure of autonomy illustrates how both side’s changing demands and tactics 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s were shaped not only by internal debates but also by regional 
and international actors, such as the European Union. 
However, the Kurdish national movement is neither monolithic in its views on the scope 
and substance of the powers to be devolved nor devolution is indeed the extent of their ambitions. 
Formulations of devolution offered by movement actors range from the assumption of modest 
additional powers and responsibilities by local governments, coupled with greater financial 
autonomy, to a federal solution modeled on the KRG of northern Iraq, in which the central 
government’s presence is minimal.14 One development that has made this debate more fraught in 
recent years is Öcalan and other PKK leaders’ adoption of the concept of “democratic 
confederalism” or “democratic autonomy”. Shrouded in substantial ambiguity, it is unclear how 
expansive of a form of autonomy for Turkey’s Kurds this model envisages, and whether it can be 
implemented without upending Turkey’s territorial integrity or unitary state structure. Is this 
concept consistent with the PKK’s stated commitment to secure the rights of Kurds within the 
framework of a democratic Turkey, or does it imply a desire for independence? The slipperiness 
of the concept has aroused suspicion among many Turks that the PKK is simply using artful 
                                                          
10 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 25. 
11 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 25. 
12 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 25-26. 
13 Kaliber and Aydin-Düzgit, Is Turkey De-Europeanising? 




rhetoric to sneak its old separatist aim of carving out a greater Kurdistan (encompassing adjacent 
portions of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran) through the back door.15 
As for Turkey, it has yet to generate the appropriate incentive structure for members of the 
PKK to lay down their weapons and see peaceful participation in Turkey’s democratic system as 
a promising alternative to the continuation of armed struggle. The Turkish government did take 
some steps to encourage a transformation, such as the democratization package enacted in 
September 2013 that allowed those previously convicted of terrorism charges and crimes against 
the state to join political parties.16 However, other measures need to be taken to make that change 
meaningful. These measures include a provision or pledge to remove the PKK from the list of 
terrorist groups contingent upon progress towards disarmament and demobilization, the enactment 
of a limited amnesty law for former PKK militants, the lowering of the threshold for parties to be 
represented in Parliament from 10 percent to 5 percent (which disproportionately disadvantages 
pro-Kurdish parties), and amendments to the anti-terror law that have had a chilling effect on non-
violent, pro-Kurdish activism.17 
Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations have displayed far more structural coherence than 
Turkish-Kurdish talks. The most serious and sustained efforts to achieve peace were carried out 
within the framework of the Oslo Accords, which were launched with the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO). The precedent for Israeli and Palestinian representatives engaging in face-to-
face negotiations on a regular basis was established with the Madrid Conference, an international 
peace conference jointly sponsored by the U.S. and Soviet Union in October 1991 in the wake of 
Gulf War. From the Madrid conference emerged both a multilateral negotiations track whereby 
issues of concern to the region as a whole were deliberated (encompassing the topics of water 
resources, the environment, arms control, refugees and economic development) and a bilateral 
track for direct negotiations that was held in Washington between Israel and the neighboring Arab 
states with whom it was still formally at war, namely Lebanon, Syria and Jordan/Palestine.18 
                                                          
15 Ertegil, “Analysis of the AKP Government’s Policy,” 33; Kirschner, Trust and Fear in Civil Wars, 120. 
What often lends credence to Turks’ fears that “democratic autonomy” or “democratic confederalism” is 
simply separatism under a new guise is the fact that some proponents of this concept mention in the same 
breath the proposal for Kurds to establish a local defense force, even after a peace agreement is signed. To 
many Turks, this proposal is anathema, as it smacks of an attempt to establish a separate armed formation 
that could be used to support a drive for complete independence for the Kurds.  
16 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234, 15. 
17 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 234. 
18 Kreisberg, “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 380. Palestinian 
representatives from the Occupied Territories participated as junior partners in a Jordanian-led delegation 
in the bilateral negotiations held in Washington. The entire arrangement surrounding the composition of 
the Jordanian delegation was in effect an elaborate diplomatic sleight of hand designed to fulfill the Israeli 
government’s need not to be seen as engaging directly with the PLO, which was at that time prohibited 
under Israeli law. The umbrella that the Jordanians provided to the Palestinian members of the delegation 
furnished the necessary legal cover for Israel, while the fact that the Palestinian members were separately 




The discussions that began in Oslo in January 1993, which originated as informal, secret, 
back-channel negotiations between a small group of Israeli academics and PLO figures, with 
Norwegian facilitation, was originally conceived of as a means of breaking the logjam in the 
official bilateral negotiations. Progress in the Washington talks was stymied by the combination 
of the public nature of the discussions, which made it difficult for either the Israeli or Palestinian 
negotiators to propose compromise formulas without exposing themselves to a severe backlash 
from their opposition at home, and the limited room for maneuver of the Palestinian delegation, 
which though nominally independent, was politically constrained from making or accepting 
concessions without the PLO’s approval.19 The Oslo negotiations rapidly gathered momentum and 
soon eclipsed the bilateral negotiations in Washington as the aforementioned obstacles to the 
success of the latter proved insurmountable. 
Nonetheless, the Madrid Conference and the negotiations it spawned represented a 
milestone for Arab-Israeli diplomacy as it brought Israel and its Arab adversaries into direct 
contact with each other in an international forum for the first time. The American-brokered Camp 
David Accords concluded between Egypt and Israel in 1978 also gave rise to concepts that were 
pivotal in shaping future negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, especially the notion of 
phased-in Palestinian autonomy that was at the core of the approach established by the Oslo 
Accords. The terms of reference for all three sets of negotiations - the Palestinian autonomy talks 
that followed the Camp David Accords, the post-Madrid bilateral talks and the Oslo Accords – 
were the “land for peace” resolutions, namely UN Resolutions 242 and 338. 
As the most advanced Israeli-Palestinian negotiating framework to date, the Oslo Accords 
were accompanied by elaborate, agreed-upon protocols for the completion of specified interim 
steps by each party within strict timeframes. In other words, Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations 
in the 1990s did not have the same kind of ad-hoc character that has hampered Turkish-Kurdish 
negotiations. Nonetheless, procedural rigor did not yield the expected payoff, as judged by the 
spectacular collapse of the Oslo peace process in late 2000 and the outbreak of a second Palestinian 
intifada or uprising. 
The breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been attributed to a wide variety 
of factors, including the pervasive mistrust between the two parties, which is explored extensively 
below. However, at least some of the failure rests with some inherent design flaws of the Oslo 
framework that became more consequential as the process evolved. The critical deficiency – 
though one which was a product of deliberate design – was the logic of gradualism built into the 
core of the agreement. Based on the underlying premise that mutual mistrust was too entrenched 
among Israelis and Palestinians to permit the thorniest issues of the conflict to be dealt with 
upfront, the Oslo Accords set forth a step-by-step process that “deliberately deferred decisions on 
all of the difficult substantive questions”.20 
                                                          
body in exile in Tunis allowed the PLO to claim that their needs and interests were being safeguarded at 
the negotiating table as well.  
19 Putnam and Carcasson, “Communication and the Oslo Negotiation”, 255; Kreisberg, “Mediation and the 
Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, 382. 




Unlike the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the “final status issues” that comprised the end game 
of negotiations, including the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees and their 
descendants, the disposition of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, borders and security, 
were explicitly recognized by the parties at the outset of the process. However, the incrementalist 
logic of the Oslo framework, and the perception that there was too big of a trust gap at the outset 
of the process to permit a healthy discussion of these fundamental issues,21 inhibited efforts to 
define and outline areas of consensus that could have guided discussions when final status 
negotiations did commence in 1999. There were sporadic efforts in this vein, such as the Roadmap 
for Peace announced by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002. However, 
this initiative foundered in large part on various provisions that the Palestinians regarded as a non-
starter, especially the proposal for the Palestinian state to be based initially on “provisional 
borders” and excluding East Jerusalem, the intended capital of a future Palestinian state.22 
Conflict resolution would have been aided immeasurably had the parties conducted even a 
preliminary exercise at the outset of the process to delineate the contours and principles of a 
workable agreement for each of the topics on the final status agenda. In December 2000, just such 
an exercise was performed when then-U.S. President Bill Clinton laid down detailed parameters 
for the resolution of these issues. The Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams drew heavily on 
these parameters in the talks held in Taba, Egypt in January 2001, an occasion at which the parties 
claimed they had come closer than ever to reaching a final agreement.23 However, by then, large-
scale violence had flared up and the constellation of political conditions – especially a lame duck 
American president and an Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, in which much of the Israeli public 
lost confidence – conspired against progress. 
Mistrust and Missed Opportunities 
Deep-seated distrust has been among the most seemingly impenetrable barriers to the 
achievement of a comprehensive resolution in each conflict. The profound distrust the conflicting 
parties have towards each other is reflected in the fact that in each conflict dyad, the parties harbor 
deep-seated suspicions of the other side’s ambitions. The parties put little credence in their 
adversaries’ declared end goals, believing that their true objectives are far more expansive and 
ambitious than they claim, and in fact pose a threat to their very existence. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, this is manifested in the oft-stated concern of Israeli officials that despite the professed 
aim of the Palestinian Authority to settle for an independent state on 22% of the territory of historic 
Palestine (as defined by the boundaries of the former British Mandate), and to recognize Israeli 
sovereignty over the remainder, talk of territorial compromise by the Palestinians is a ruse designed 
                                                          
21 Benn, “Shimon Peres, as Captured in a Confidante’s Diary.” In a fascinating interview recently published 
in the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, Avi Gil, who served as senior aide to Shimon Peres, the then-Israeli 
foreign minister at the time the Declaration of Principles was signed (and one of the architects of the Oslo 
Accords), justified this gradualist logic succinctly: “It was impossible to go further at Oslo. There is an in-
built hitch in every interim agreement. Why do those agreements exist? Because it’s impossible otherwise. 
To take Israel and the Palestinians during that period to a final-status agreement was impossible.”  
22 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, 296. 




to lull Israel into a false sense of security and grant Palestinians an independent mini-state, only 
for it to be used as a launching pad to attack Israel and “drive the Jews into the sea”. This persistent 
Israeli fear of the Palestinians’ allegedly ulterior motives, commonly referred to as the “plan of 
stages”, has been voiced by leaders of political parties who supported and opposed a two-state 
solution alike.24 As Ben-Ami (2007) explains, the non-negotiable demand that Israel has set forth 
that a future Palestinian state be demilitarized is based on an enduring fear of “potential Palestinian 
revisionism” and “a subsequent renewed belligerency by the future Palestinian state.”25 
The Turkish government, along with much of Turkish society, harbors a similar type of 
phobia concerning the ambitions of the Kurdish national movement, one that is also borne of 
mistrust. In their eyes, a separatist agenda lurks behind the relatively modest Kurdish demand for 
mother tongue education in public schools, a demand almost universally shared by Kurdish rights 
activists both within and outside of the PKK/KCK structure. According to this mindset, if Turkey 
were to undertake such language reforms, this would inevitably whet Kurds’ ambitions, and 
embolden them to demand a robust form of autonomy or a federal solution. As these demands 
escalate, Turkey’s territorial integrity and national unity would be increasingly endangered, 
potentially culminating in the unraveling of the state itself.26 A twist on this phobia, commonly 
known as the “Sevres syndrome”, holds that Kurdish demands to expand Kurdish language 
education and for the delegation of greater decision-making powers to local administrations are 
not an authentic reflection of homegrown Kurdish grievances, but rather have been manufactured 
by Western/European powers intent on weakening and destabilizing Turkey.27 
 Another manifestation of the extreme mistrust between the main parties in each conflict is 
a deep-seated pessimism regarding the prospects of conflict resolution. In both the case of Turkey 
and the Kurds and Israel and the Palestinians, a strong yearning for peaceful conflict resolution is 
paired with an equally strong lack of faith in the adversary’s willingness to honor the terms of any 
peace accord and to coexist peacefully with one’s own ethnic group. This creates a paradox: while 
each side is convinced of its own commitment to peace, the overarching belief that its adversary 
will not accept the compromises necessary to achieve peace causes it to balk at making the 
fundamental concessions that the latter insists upon as the price for an acceptable settlement. For 
instance, with respect to American Jewish attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Waxman (2017) observes, 
                                                          
24 Shamir and Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion, 66. 
25 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, 247-248. 
26 International Crisis Group, ICG Europe Report No. 219, 26; Kirschner, Trust and Fear in Civil Wars, 
120-121. An excerpt from the ICG report encapsulates well many Turks’ beliefs that Kurdish activists’ 
demands for language reforms and equal citizenship mask a more sinister agenda: “Important figures in 
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Most American Jews are therefore deeply ambivalent in their attitudes towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. They want peace and favor some Israeli territorial concessions, but 
they also worry about Israeli security and are highly suspicious of Palestinians’ intentions 
. . . They want Israel to end the occupation, but they do not want Israel to take any security 
risks. They want Palestinians to have a state of their own, but they do not want this state to 
be a threat to Israel in any way.28 
 This risk-averse mindset proves to be problematic, even fatal to peace efforts for two 
reasons. First, an extreme reluctance to make meaningful concessions that an adversary identifies 
as the bare minimum required for an acceptable settlement can severely diminish the latter’s 
confidence in one’s good faith to the point that the peace process itself is jeopardized. This was 
clearly the case with the peace process that followed the signing of the Oslo Accords between 
Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993. The Oslo peace process, which was in effect until 
approximately January 2001, was based on a logic of gradualism whereby Israel took incremental 
steps to relinquish control over civilian affairs to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in exchange for the Palestinians taking measures to guarantee Israel’s security. This 
step-by-step process suited the preferences of an Israeli public that, while hungry for peace, cast a 
wary eye on Yasser Arafat, the president of the Palestinian Authority, and other leaders of his 
Fatah movement, due to the long history of terror attacks Israel suffered at the latter’s hands. 
 Israel’s excessively risk-averse posture towards peace with the Palestinians, which was 
rooted in the enduring apprehension that the Palestinian Authority was not a suitable peace partner, 
eroded Palestinian goodwill and contributed to the collapse of the Oslo Accords and the outbreak 
of a second intifada in 2000. These negative consequences were especially evident in the dynamics 
and outcome of the final status negotiations that took place at the Camp David summit convened 
by then-American President Bill Clinton in July 2000. Fearing that the Palestinians were prone to 
pocketing Israeli concessions without offering anything of substance in return, then-Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak repeatedly misrepresented his early positions on the final status issues as 
unmovable bottom lines. Though Barak was prepared to compromise at a point much closer to the 
Palestinians’ ideal positions on the issues in dispute, he reasoned that displaying firmness 
bordering on rigidity would place the onus on the Palestinians to make concessions, whereas a 
flexible posture would only embolden the Palestinians to demand more. In other words, harboring 
great mistrust of Arafat’s ultimate intentions, Barak found it prudent to err on the side of being too 
firm rather than being too flexible. However, the ironic result is that the Palestinians accused Israel 
of negotiating in bad faith and reverted to a hardline stance in response when it became clear that 
Barak was systematically misrepresenting his true preferences.29 
Secondly, an unwillingness to take substantial risks for peace based on mistrust of the 
adversary’s intentions can lead one to backtrack on an emerging peace process at the slightest sign 
of public dissatisfaction with the process. This was evident when the governing AKP (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, or the Justice and Development Party) virtually walked away from the 
Democratic Opening (otherwise known as the “Kurdish Opening”), a reform-minded initiative that 
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was spearheaded by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to address Turkey’s Kurdish 
question in 2009. The Democratic Opening included groundbreaking measures to expand avenues 
for Kurdish linguistic and cultural self-expression, including granting a license to a public satellite 
television channel (TRT-6) offering exclusive programming in the Kurdish language, and relaxing 
long-standing restrictions on its use in election campaigns, prisons, universities and mosque 
sermons.30 
However, the process hit a major roadblock and the Turkish government’s will to go the 
distance waned in the wake of a botched amnesty for PKK militants at the Habur crossing along 
Turkey’s border with northern Iraq on October 22, 2009. In this incident, a limited amnesty that 
was pre-arranged between the Turkish government and political representatives of the Kurdish 
national movement in Turkey went awry when the returning Turkish citizens, eight PKK guerillas 
dressed in their combat fatigues, and twenty six refugees, were given a hero’s welcome by a 
Kurdish crowd. Some analysts and observers assert that the crowd’s reaction was simply a 
spontaneous burst of euphoria rooted in an optimistic expectation that a new era of peace and 
reconciliation was at hand.31 However, Turkish nationalist sentiment was aroused when, 
subsequently, representatives of the pro-Kurdish party, the DTP (Turkish acronym for the 
Democratic Society Party) paraded the returnees around several cities in the Kurdish southeast.32 
The Turkish media portrayed this move as a victory lap by the PKK, designed to underscore the 
PKK’s message that nothing short of violence would have compelled Turkey to come to grips with 
Kurdish claims and demands.33 
The optics of the event thus turned what was supposed to be a confidence-building measure 
aimed at catalyzing a broader reconciliation into a public relations fiasco for the Turkish 
government. In tandem, the Turkish public quickly soured on the Democratic Opening in the 
aftermath of the Habur episode, with general support for the reform initiative plummeting from 
45.6 percent to 32.1 percent, along with an even more precipitous drop in support among AKP 
voters.34 To shore up its flagging support among the swing nationalist voters as well as the 
traditional AKP base, and reassure them that the state had not simply caved in to the PKK’s 
demands, Erdoğan’s government had 10 out of the 34 returnees at Habur arrested and indicted, 
while the remainder fled back to Iraq.35 
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The Habur event is instructive for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that in the absence of 
minimal levels of prior trust between two conflicting parties, a peace process can be perched on a 
knife-edge equilibrium, easily susceptible to reversals at the slightest sign of difficulty. This is 
evident in the fact that ordinary Turks’ support for the Democratic Opening almost instantly 
evaporated in the wake of the Habur episode or more appropriately, due to their prevailing 
perceptions of the episode. Ordinary Turks were overwhelmingly swayed by the Turkish media’s 
nationalist-tinged depiction of the event (namely, that the PKK had exploited the return to flex its 
muscles and symbolically declare victory, while deliberately humiliating the government and 
wounding Turkish national pride in the process) and seized upon it to register their overwhelming 
disapproval of the peace process. Stung by the unexpected nationalist backlash, the Turkish 
government applied the brakes on the Democratic Opening shortly thereafter.36 
The governing AKP’s handling (or mishandling, depending upon one’s perspective) of the 
Habur event and its diminished enthusiasm for pursuing the Democratic Opening in the wake of 
the incident points to another significant observation concerning the corrosive impact of mistrust 
in peace processes. Specifically, the mere fear of triggering a groundswell of nationalist objections 
prompted the AKP to be deliberately vague in its communications with the Turkish public and 
opposition parties about the goals of the opening and where it was ultimately headed.37 However, 
this strategic, guarded approach towards the opening created a fatal paradox: the very failure to 
shape and manage public expectations about the opening and to articulate the logic behind 
controversial steps, such as the limited amnesty at Habur all but guaranteed that such steps would 
become mired in controversy and invite the focused opposition of nationalist circles. As Karaveli 
(2010) states: 
If the government was indeed trying to avoid provoking a nationalist backlash – which 
seems probable --by choosing to remain somewhat opaque about the ultimate direction of 
the opening, in a sense enticing the Turkish nationalist public to believe that there was 
nothing to worry about, it failed. The nationalists were not fooled. Ultimately, the very 
“openness” of the Kurdish initiative of the government had the adverse effect of fueling 
suspicions and inviting the wildest of speculations and conspiracy theories.38 
In short, the Habur debacle demonstrates that peace processes in societies characterized by 
entrenched mistrust towards the rival ethnic group will often founder due to the conflicting parties’ 
hyper-sensitivity to skeptical publics. Failure can result from a combination of hesitation, born of 
an overabundance of caution, to condition properly the public for the concessions required for 
peace, or from sharply pulling back when nationalist sentiment in opposition to the peace process 
reaches a fever pitch. Both were operative in the Turkish case. 
 The Democratic Opening represents just one missed opportunity for conflict resolution in 
the thirty-five-year-old conflict between the PKK (and its political/civil society wings) and the 
Turkish state, and arguably not even the most consequential one. The political ground surrounding 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict resolution efforts shifted considerably in the years following the 
Democratic Opening. This is due in large part to the fact that Erdoğan who transitioned from prime 
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minister to becoming Turkey’s first directly elected president in 2014 underwent a sea change in 
his preferences towards peace. This is most evident in his controversial response to the issuance 
of the Dolmabahçe Declaration in February 2015. 
The declaration was the culmination of talks held between a Turkish government 
delegation made up of Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and the Minister of Interior Efkan 
Ala and three deputies of the pro-Kurdish HDP (Turkish acronym for the “People’s Democratic 
Party”), Sırrı Süreyya Önder, İdris Baluken and Pervin Buldan, whereby they achieved a consensus 
on a ten-article road map for a resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.39 The Turkish 
government’s supplanting of the Turkish intelligence agency (MİT) as the primary interlocutor in 
negotiations with the Kurdish national movement was symbolic in its own right.40 However, the 
development that lent a historical aura to the gathering at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul and 
signaled that peace was just over the horizon was the narration by the HDP deputies present of a 
statement by Öcalan calling for an extraordinary PKK congress to be convened with the aim of 
declaring an end to the armed struggle.41 Various accounts also indicate that agreement was 
reached concerning the formation of a joint monitoring committee,42 which was widely recognized 
as an important step in putting the negotiations on a firmer legal footing and signaling a seriousness 
of purpose.43 
 The sense of promise spawned by the Dolmabahçe Declaration, however, almost 
immediately evaporated as Erdoğan distanced himself from the agreement and ultimately 
renounced it altogether. Erdoğan insisted that the Turkish government did not properly consult 
him in advance of the talks that laid the groundwork for the agreement, a claim contradicted by 
leading representatives of the Turkish government and members of his own AKP, especially 
former Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç.44 Many plausible reasons can be cited for Erdoğan’s 
repudiation of the Dolmabahçe Declaration. However, the emergence of the HDP and its co-chair 
Selahattin Demirtaş as the most vociferous opponent of Erdoğan’s overarching ambition to hold a 
constitutional referendum that would change Turkey’s political system to one where the 
presidency was vested with the lion’s share of power offers the most compelling explanation for 
why Erdogan soured on the peace initiative so quickly and sought to discredit the HDP as a 
legitimate interlocutor.45 
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In contrast to the Habur episode, there is no discernible role that trust, or the lack thereof 
played in the unwillingness of the Turkish government (or at least Erdoğan himself) to bring the 
Dolmabahçe initiative to fruition. Rather, parochial considerations related to Erdoğan’s grand 
design to alter the Constitution to concentrate authority in the hands of the presidency, as discussed 
above, played the dominant role. However, the consequences of what was widely perceived to be 
a missed opportunity for conflict resolution had a profoundly negative effect on Turkish Kurds’ 
perceptions of the Turkish government’s commitment to peace and reconciliation. Tangible 
gestures that the Turkish government undertook in the run-up to the Dolmabahçe meeting to create 
a more robust framework for negotiations, such as the construction of a large meeting room in the 
İmralı prison where Öcalan is based, which was built to accommodate a joint monitoring 
committee, raised Kurds’ expectations of the Turkish government’s determination to pursue a 
peaceful settlement and exacerbated the sense of betrayal they felt when Erdoğan abruptly 
disavowed the Dolmabahçe understandings.46 
Secret Peace Negotiations: The Exception to the Rule 
 Both the Turkish-Kurdish and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts featured periods of backchannel, 
secret negotiations in which the conflicting parties were able to circumvent many of the 
aforementioned structural and psychological obstacles, especially those stemming from a paucity 
of trust. In some respects, the parties made significantly greater headway in reaching common 
ground on the core issues in contention than they did in open negotiations due to the unique 
atmosphere facilitated by the covert nature of the discussions. Therefore, these negotiating 
episodes warrant brief discussion. 
 In the Turkish-Kurdish case, the secret talks were conducted in Oslo from 2006 to 2011 
between the undersecretary (head) of the Turkish national intelligence agency (MİT), Emre Taner 
(and his successor Hakan Fidan), the deputy undersecretary of the MİT, Afet Güneş, and the 
leading members of the PKK: Sabri Ok, Mustafa Karasu, Adem Uzun and Zübeyir Aydar.47 
Mediation was provided by representatives of the British intelligence services, while the 
Norwegian and Swedish governments managed the logistics of the meetings. The talks continued 
until crucial details, including meeting minutes, were leaked to the press in 2011. According to 
Kadıoğlu, the negotiations yielded substantial progress, with the parties reaching mutual 
understanding on the way forward for 90-95 percent of the core issues (according to Hakan Fidan), 
including making amendments to the Constitution to strip out any articles that promote ethnic 
discrimination and privilege the Turkish identity at the expense of Kurdish and other minority 
identities.48 
Among other benefits, the secrecy surrounding the negotiations allowed the Turkish and 
Kurdish representatives to be insulated from what Kadıoğlu terms “audience effects”, or the 
negative attention and reaction of skeptical domestic political opposition and public opinion.49 
Negotiators enjoy far greater latitude to offer far-reaching concessions and compromises and probe 
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the other party’s intentions when the intense media coverage and scrutiny associated with public 
negotiations is absent, as was the case in the secret, backchannel talks in Oslo. The aforementioned 
Habur debacle, which was one of the byproducts of the Oslo talks,50 exemplifies how susceptible 
confidence-building gestures that were laboriously negotiated in secret, backchannel talks are to 
reversal when the veil is lifted and concessions are exposed to the harsh glare of the media. 
The discussions that took place in 1993 that culminated in the signing of the Oslo Accords 
(or the Declaration of Principles) between Israel and the PLO on the White House lawn on 
September 13, 1993 shed light on other advantages of secret talks. One of the benefits of the 
secretive, backchannel process pursued in Oslo was the fact that the leaders (or ‘principals’) of 
each party (Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the case of Israel and Yasser Arafat in the case of the 
Palestinians) were detached from the negotiations process. This endowed the ‘agents’ who 
represented them at the bargaining table with substantial flexibility to explore options and test the 
other side’s reaction without irrevocably committing to them.51 This flexibility could not have 
been replicated in a transparent, public negotiation process where the principals are automatically 
and visibly identified with any proposals and concessions that the negotiators may make on their 
behalf, such that the former’s reputations will be at risk in the event that such concessions prove 
to be unpopular. 
In many respects, the Oslo negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians engendered 
greater success than the secret talks between the Turkish government and the PKK, as the former 
led to a signed agreement, the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles, in which the PLO and 
the Israeli government exchanged letters of mutual recognition. One factor that likely contributed 
to the difference in negotiating outcomes is the more active and varied roles assumed by the 
Norwegian intermediaries in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as contrasted with those 
undertaken by the British intelligence services in the clandestine Turkish government-PKK talks. 
In the Turkish-Kurdish talks, the British intelligence representatives settled for a rather passive 
facilitative role of enabling the conflicting parties to understand each other’s positions better, while 
refraining from offering any proposals or formulas to bridge the gaps.52 In contrast, in the Israeli-
Palestinian talks in Oslo, the contribution of the Norwegian intermediaries went beyond 
facilitation. By nudging both sides to make concessions and at times, offering compromise 
formulas to break the logjam, the Norwegian mediators actively assisted in crafting the agreement 
that emerged from the talks.53 
In both of the secret negotiations episodes, the presence of third party mediators was vital 
to building trust and cultivating interpersonal relationships between the parties. However, in both 
cases, there was an apparent tradeoff between the positive interpersonal chemistry and relatively 
congenial atmosphere fostered within the negotiations, on one hand, and the challenge of managing 
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the impressions of the broader public, on the other.54 The insular small group dynamics of both 
negotiations fostered a self-affirming belief that the road maps worked out by the negotiators were 
the only viable and legitimate path forward. However, the shrouding of the negotiations in secrecy 
generated mistrust, if not outright opposition, among key stakeholders and politically significant 
constituencies who chafed at their exclusion from the process after the negotiations were 
publicized.55 
Increasing Societal Polarization and Its Impact 
 A sharp increase in antagonism towards the opposing ethnic group among ordinary citizens 
in recent years constitutes another common denominator in the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-
Kurdish cases that poses a serious impediment to peace. In the Turkish-Kurdish case, it was an 
article of faith for many years that the bloodshed resulting from military operations waged by the 
Turkish Armed Forces and terrorist attacks perpetrated by the PKK that has cumulatively claimed 
over 40,000 lives would not spill over into the realm of inter-communal relations between Turks 
and Kurds. Ironically, the dominant narrative of the conflict proffered by the state, namely that the 
PKK was a fringe organization that could boast of few supporters within Turkey and was in fact a 
stooge of outside powers, helped insulate ordinary Kurds from a popular Turkish backlash,56 even 
as it undermined the prospects of conflict resolution through the Turkish state’s refusal to 
acknowledge that the PKK’s violent insurgency was a byproduct of the long-standing official 
policy of denial of Kurdish identity. 
However, as Saraçoğlu (2009) explains, the confluence of several developments has altered 
the fabric of Turkish-Kurdish relations in the cities of Western Turkey and generated growing 
antipathy towards the Kurds.57 The most important driver of these dynamics is the influx of 
Kurdish migrants from the southeastern provinces - mainly as a result of displacement in village 
clearing operations undertaken by the Turkish military - into the shanty towns of cities of Western 
Turkey. Rising anti-Kurdish prejudice emerges from a bottom-up process whereby superficial 
interactions with Kurdish migrants in everyday urban life prompt ordinary Turks to produce and 
reproduce negative stereotypes, including associations of Kurds with ignorance, cultural 
backwardness, separatism and criminality.58 This mentality assumes an ethnic cast, claiming these 
negative attributes to be an integral part of Kurdishness itself.59 Kurds have also been accused of 
colluding with each other in illegal mafia-like schemes to monopolize economic opportunities and 
deprive Turks of their fair share of wealth.60 
Even the high rates of Kurdish participation in the informal economic sector – a sector 
universally associated with marginality, insecurity and depressed standards of living - have been 
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re-interpreted by some Turks as a form of rent-seeking, self-dealing behavior.61 Saraçoğlu (2009) 
labels this constellation of attitudes “exclusive recognition”.62 On one hand, as a point of departure 
from the traditional state discourse that sought to deny the existence of a distinct Kurdish ethnic 
identity until early 1990s, it explicitly recognizes Kurds as a separate ethnic group. On the other 
hand, instead of embracing these differences, a growing percentage of urban Turks adopt a 
discourse that stigmatizes Kurdish identity and portrays Kurds as a threat to their economic status, 
and even to general morals and public order.63 
Ergin (2012) adopts a complementary perspective, pointing to the growing tendency of 
Turks to recognize Kurds as a distinctive ethnic group while simultaneously expressing and 
demonstrating contempt for such differences.64 Paradoxically, now that the state-sanctioned 
assimilationist mindset that denied the uniqueness of the Kurdish people has crumbled, Turkish 
society is forced to reckon with diversity and the modal response has been one of adamant rejection 
of multiculturalism.65 This rejection is manifested in a process that Ergin (2012) terms “the 
racialization of Kurdish identity, which possesses four attributes: 1) an emphasis on physical 
characteristics as a marker of Kurdishness; 2) the association of Kurdish identity with a lack of 
cultural refinement and moral probity; 3) the increasing assignment rather than self-assertion of 
Kurdish identity; 4) the fear of Kurds overtaking Turks demographically and economically. 
Various anecdotal evidence of overt discrimination carried out by Turks against Kurds 
confirms the impression of a conflict that has acquired racial overtones. One notable incident 
involved the harassment of Kurdish students, donning traditional attire, who, in the process of 
organizing a picnic at a university near Izmir, were attacked by a lynch mob of Turks. Despite 
being the victims of the attack, they were indicted by a public prosecutor for promoting the 
symbols of a banned terrorist organization (the PKK), based on seemingly spurious evidence.66 At 
times, racialization of the Turkish-Kurdish fault line has shaded into calls for the annihilation of 
Kurds, as when in 2012, in the midst of a popular backlash against the Turkish government’s 
overtures to the Kurds following a new wave of PKK attacks, one of the top Twitter expressions 
in Turkish became: “we don’t want an opening; we want a massacre.”67 
The hardening of intolerant attitudes on the part of Turks towards any outward signs or 
symbols of ‘traditional’ Kurdish cultural identity has been paralleled by signs of a fraying 
commitment to peaceful co-existence with their Kurdish neighbors. Indicators of this attitudinal 
shift abound. An on-line survey conducted in August 2012 found that one in four Turks did not 
want to live with Kurds, compared to only 2 per cent of Kurds who did not want to live with 
Turks.68 Kirschner (2012) mentions in the same vein how many Turks in urban areas refuse to rent 
apartments to Kurds and how despite the high rates of intermarriage between Turks and Kurds, the 
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decision to intermarry increasingly opens up rifts in the extended Turkish families of intermarried 
couples.69 
Rising Turkish antipathy towards Kurds and the inter-communal tensions that follow from 
this have been and continue to be detrimental to the peace process and prospects of reconciliation 
in a multiplicity of ways. First, as discussed above, the diminished willingness of Turks to accept 
Kurds as neighbors (though not evidently vice versa) threatens to erode the very basis of 
reconciliation, which relies upon mutual amity between the two ethnic groups and a belief in a 
shared future on the part of ordinary citizens. Secondly, the visceral prejudice that a growing 
number of Kurds experience and report in the urban environment contribute to a growing sense of 
marginalization and disenchantment. In turn, an angry and disaffected Kurdish population provides 
fertile ground for PKK recruitment. As stated in the International Crisis Group’s (2012) report 
titled, “Turkey’s Kurdish Impasse: The View from Diyarbakir”, “The sharpening atmosphere of 
discrimination is again strengthening support for the PKK, just as the PKK offensive since 2011 
has brought back polarisation reminiscent of the worst years of violence in the 1990s.”70 Finally, 
the increasing tendency of Turks to equate Kurdishness itself with the objectives and violent tactics 
of the PKK71 is a dangerous development that risks turning into a self-fulfilling prophesy if restive 
Kurdish youth become convinced that even peaceful methods of Kurdish rights advocacy will be 
automatically branded as illegitimate by Turks, and subsequently embrace violence out of a sense 
of despair. In this vein, Başaran (2017) frames the rise of the YDG-H (Turkish acronym for the 
Revolutionary Patriotic Youth Movement), the youth wing of the PKK which spearheaded the 
urban warfare campaign against Turkish security forces in late 2015, as emblematic of an 
“outraged generation” animated by vengeance and possessing a bleak outlook on prospects for 
future reconciliation with Turks.72 
Israeli and Palestinian/Arab attitudes towards the rival ethnic group in the conflict have 
also evolved in ways that do not bode well for prospects of peace, with a commitment to co-
existence decreasing on both sides, albeit with a more pronounced shift on the part of Israeli Jews. 
It is important to note that the attitudes being surveyed on the Palestinian side concern those of the 
Arab population of Israel proper, who comprise approximately 20% of the country’s population, 
rather than those who live under Israeli military rule in the occupied territories of East Jerusalem, 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Even though Israeli Arabs have concerns and interests that 
diverge from those of their Palestinian counterparts,73 they do confront some of the same structural 
problems (e.g., discrimination and unequal access to resources, services and infrastructure, among 
others). Moreover, ebbs and flows in tensions between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews tend to reflect 
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the prevailing conditions on the ground in the Occupied Territories, with Israeli-Arab tensions 
often flaring up when unrest and violence between Israelis and Palestinians spikes. 
Taking these disclaimers into account, signs of polarization are increasingly evident on 
both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide. According to “the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations”, a regular 
survey taken by Haifa University professor Sammy Smooha, as of 2017, similar to the evolving 
Turkish attitudes towards Kurds, Israeli Jews’ commitment to co-existence with their fellow Arab 
citizens has waned. Some 48 percentage of Israeli Jews do not want to have Arabs as neighbors, 
an increase of seven percentage points from just two years earlier, while their willingness to allow 
Arab children to attend the same school as their own children sharply declined from 57.5 percent 
to 51.5 percent.74 
Increased support for ethnic segregation has been accompanied by a rise in illiberal 
sentiments, as evidenced by the fact that the percentage of Israeli Jewish respondents 
acknowledging that Arab citizens should have full rights dropped from 80 percent to 74 percent.75 
Likewise, according to a different poll taken by the Israeli Democracy Institute, more than 40 
percent of Israeli Jews said that Arabs should not be allowed to purchase land outside of their 
neighborhoods and communities.76 These attitudes extend to the question of shared governance, 
as indicated by high levels of support for perpetuating the existing inequities in the Israeli political 
system that ensure the dominance of Jewish parties and largely freeze out Arab parties. According 
to the Israeli Democracy Institute poll, two-thirds of Israeli Jews are opposed to including Arab 
parties in the government and appointing Arab ministers, while over 75 percent are opposed to the 
participation of Arabs in important policy decisions.77 
A parallel rise in Israeli Arabs’ intolerance of their Jewish counterparts can be witnessed 
in the fact that according to “the Index of Jewish-Arab Relations” poll, the percentage of Arab 
respondents who acknowledge Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish and democratic state diminished 
from 53.5 percent in 2015 to 49 percent in 2017.78 This finding should not necessarily be equated 
with hostility to the very notion of Arab-Jewish co-existence. It should instead be interpreted 
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against the backdrop of the exodus of Palestinians who were displaced from their homes and 
communities in the wars of 1948 and 1967, which marked the advent of the Palestinian refugee 
problem. In the eyes of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians alike, the phrase “national home of the 
Jewish people” arouses the specter of subsequent waves of expulsion or discriminatory measures 
meant to preserve Israel’s Jewish majority at all costs. References to the Jewish character of the 
Israeli state have aroused even more acute concerns since the passage of the Jewish nation-state 
law by the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) in July 2018. This piece of legislation, which confers 
the exclusive right to national self-determination upon the Jewish people and eliminates Arabic as 
an official language, has been widely criticized by Israeli Arabs of all political stripes as equivalent 
to codifying discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel into law and according to some, 
marks a significant move in the direction of a separate but unequal apartheid-like system. 79 
Perceived rejection by Arabs of what an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews define as 
the essence and raison d'être of their state reinforces intolerant and exclusionary attitudes on their 
part. This is evident in the fact that according to the Israeli Democracy Institute poll, 58 percent of 
Israeli Jews favored revoking the voting rights of those Arabs who challenge the 
basic Zionist narrative of Israel as the homeland and universal refuge of the Jews.80 The question 
remains to be answered, though: to what extent does rising Israeli Jewish prejudice or intolerance 
towards Israeli Arab citizens spill over into attitudes towards peace with the Palestinians? It would 
be a gross over-exaggeration to state that there is a direct line that runs from anti-Arab sentiments 
to the degree of Israeli Jewish support for a two-state solution to the conflict and reconciliation 
with the Palestinians. In fact, the author of the “Index of Arab-Jewish Relations” survey and study, 
Sammy Smooha, takes pains to emphasize that in his view, the diminished willingness of Israeli 
Jews to live, work, and go to school with their Arab neighbors is not synonymous with anti-Arab 
racism.81 
However, Israeli Jews’ growing wariness of mixing with Israeli Arabs comes at a time that 
Israeli society is showing increasing apathy to incidents of harassment, property destruction and 
violence perpetrated by Jewish vigilante groups drawn from the ranks of the settlement movement 
against Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank. As stated by Beauchamp (2014), 
While anti-Arab racism is not rising among Israelis as a whole, according to research by 
Haifa University, what has happened is that, since the violence of the Second Intifada, 
Israelis have become much less eager to challenge anti-Palestinian racism on the Israeli 
far-right - they've become, in other words, more tolerant of intolerance. This has allowed 
far-right anti-Arab movements to fester, even as they've remained small minorities within 
Israeli society.82 
The same article points out that the climate of impunity within which anti-Arab vigilante 
groups operate, made possible by the prevailing attitude of indifference to Palestinian suffering 
among much of the Israeli public, helped set the stage for some especially violent incidents, 
including the burning alive of a 16 year-old Palestinian, Mohammed Abu Khdeir, and a rampage 
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by a Jewish mob targeting Arabs in the streets of Jerusalem, both of which occurred in 2014.83 In 
sum, negative Jewish attitudes towards Israeli Arabs and/or Palestinians may well be contributing 
to a broader breakdown in inter-ethnic relations and patterns of tit-for-tat violence that will further 
complicate the path to peace. 
Structural Disparities and Their Negative Impact on Peace Prospects 
Over-reaching security measures enacted or authorized by the stronger side in each conflict 
(Israel and Turkey) that stifle freedom of expression, conflate lawful dissent with criminality, and 
tend towards collective punishment have also contributed to an environment that is unconducive 
to the achievement of a durable peace. The heavy-handed measures undertaken by the stronger 
states in each conflict are detrimental to peace for two principal reasons. First, by suppressing 
legal, peaceful outlets for the advocacy of minority group rights and demands, Israel and Turkey 
impede the ability of the Palestinians and Kurds respectively to organize in the political arena and 
negotiate with them. Secondly, by stigmatizing or criminalizing nonviolent methods of struggle, 
they send a signal to the weaker party that nonviolent opposition will be dealt with just as forcefully 
as terrorism and other acts of violence. This generates few incentives to moderate and lends 
ammunition to the arguments of militant groups (e.g., Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian case and 
the PKK in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict) that violence is only the effective strategy for compelling 
the stronger party to accede to the weaker side’s demands. 
In the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, vague provisions of the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal 
Code have been invoked by Turkish authorities to stifle Kurdish activists’ freedom of expression, 
and criminalize political speech and activities, such as participation in mass demonstrations, with 
no demonstrable violent intent. In April 2009, at the same time that the Erdoğan government 
launched the ‘Democratic Opening’, it authorized a broad crackdown against Kurdish activists, 
accusing them of links with the Kurdish national movement’s umbrella organization, the Kurdistan 
Communities Union (the ‘KCK’, or Koma Civakên Kurdistan). Thousands of arrests were made, 
often on dubious charges of spreading propaganda on behalf of a “terrorist organization”. Among 
those ensnared in the KCK operations were a variety of Kurdish politicians, activists, intellectuals, 
students and journalists, almost all of who agitated for Kurdish rights and recognition through 
legal, civil society and political channels.84 
The aforementioned arrests embody a broader pattern whereby Kurdish rights advocates 
with no track record of violent activities have been routinely painted with the same broad brush of 
criminality as PKK militants. According to PKK/KCK leader Murat Karayılan, at least 85% of the 
detainees were not even members of his organization.85 As the height of the KCK operations 
coincided with the Democratic Opening, Turkey’s Kurds received mixed messages about the 
extent to which the Turkish government was prepared to make a clean break with the repressive 
policies of the past. In addition to casting doubt on the Turkey’s commitment to resolving the 
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Kurdish question through democratic means, the legal harassment of Kurdish activists has 
exacerbated mistrust in the judiciary, police and other Turkish institutions, and disempowered 
moderates. Such actions have also deepened the grievances of already disaffected Kurdish youth, 
pushing some of them towards violence.86 According to a BDP district mayor in Diyarbakır quoted 
in the 2012 International Crisis Group report titled, “The PKK and A Kurdish Settlement”, the 
mass arrests of legal activists from 2009 forward aroused so much anger that it led to 2,000 or 
more young people “going up to the mountains” to join the PKK.87 
The resurgence of fighting between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the PKK in 2015 
has only reinforced Erdoğan’s tendency to neutralize the legal Kurdish opposition (the HDP, 
Turkish acronym for “The Peoples’ Democratic Party”) through repressive measures. This was 
embodied in legislation, passed by the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) in late 2016, which stripped 
HDP deputies of their immunity from prosecution, paving the way for all but four of the 59 
members of the HDP parliamentary delegation, including the leadership of the party, to be tried 
for a host of politically motivated charges such as “supporting terrorism” and “disseminating 
propaganda on behalf of a terrorist organization”.88 The wide net the Turkish government has cast 
appears to be part of a thinly-veiled effort to undercut the HDP’s ability to compete on a level 
playing field with the AKP in Turkish elections. Moreover, heavy-handed security measures have 
made it virtually impossible for even those Kurds who are most committed to a peaceful resolution 
to the conflict to organize and negotiate effectively. As stated in the 2012 International Crisis 
Group report titled, “The PKK and A Kurdish Settlement”, 
Large-scale arrests of its parliamentary deputies, elected mayors, provincial party chiefs 
and ordinary activists have undermined the BDP’s capacities, challenging its ability to 
engage on an equal footing with the government on talks to end the conflict. An 
international sympathiser pointed out: “When does BDP have time to do politics? They 
are swamped. Half of them are in prison, the other half are trying to get the others out. 
How can AKP talk to the BDP if they don’t give them the political space to work?”89  
Israel has pursued a similar policy of suppressing nonviolent outlets for the expression of 
grievances by the minority group (in this case, the Palestinians) and imposing extensive curbs on 
freedom of association, freedom of expression, and other fundamental civil liberties. Some of the 
restrictions on political activity that Palestinians face are extreme, especially by the standards of 
liberal democracies (which Israel claims to be), such as the military law that bans the gathering of 
more than ten people for political purposes in the West Bank.90 Parallel to Turkey’s treatment of 
Kurdish rights activists, Palestinian organizers of nonviolent demonstrations and civil 
disobedience actions, such as the leaders of the grassroots, nonviolent campaign against the 
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Separation Barrier in the West Bank, which has severed Palestinian villagers’ access to vast swaths 
of productive farmland, have been the targets of extensive surveillance, legal harassment, violent 
crackdowns and arrests by Israeli security forces.91 The draconian punishments Israel has meted 
out to nonviolent activists, including midnight arrest raids, successive terms of administration 
detention, deportation,92 dubious charges of inciting violence and in some cases, lethal uses of 
force,93 are suggestive of a deliberate strategy by the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) to send a 
message that civil disobedience and nonviolent forms of protest against the Israeli occupation are 
futile endeavors. This hardly inspires Palestinians’ confidence in the efficacy of nonviolent action 
and hence gives a boost to militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who are 
resolutely opposed to territorial compromise with Israel. 
Conclusion 
A detailed examination of the Israeli-Palestinian and Turkish-Kurdish conflicts, both of 
which have eluded resolution despite the seemingly endless time and energies invested in 
diplomatic efforts, has yielded some key insights into the factors that contribute to failed peace 
processes. The analysis revealed that critical deficiencies in the design of negotiating frameworks 
(especially the lack of specificity of end goals) have been detrimental to peace efforts. Other factors 
that this study identified as being responsible for the breakdown of peace processes in both cases 
are deep-seated mutual mistrust, diminished tolerance of and willingness to co-exist with the rival 
ethnic group, and overreaching security policies and practices perpetrated by the dominant ethnic 
group that deny to the weaker ethnic group the space and incentives for nonviolent forms of 
activism. 
Another research can more systematically explore the common structural deficiencies that 
rendered both peace processes susceptible to collapse. This study primarily examined attitudinal 
and psychological factors, while the structural dysfunctions associated with the negotiating 
framework of both conflicts and the process of negotiations received comparably little attention. 
One set of dynamics that merits far greater investigation is consensus-building strategies and 
whether the leaders of each party in conflict made sufficient efforts or acted effectively enough to 
mobilize support for the peace process from the general public and prominent opposition parties. 
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Did they make sufficient inroads in public opinion to insulate the process against damage from 
‘spoilers’? 
In the Turkish-Kurdish case, the preliminary answer to this question would appear to be in 
the negative. The Turkish government established a “Wise Persons Commission” in 2013 tasked 
with explaining the merits of the “solution process” to the broader Turkish public and gauging 
their demands and expectations surrounding the process.94 Comprised of 63 members, including 
opinion leaders, religious leaders, journalists, academics, activists and others, the commission was 
divided into seven sub groups corresponding to Turkey’s geographical regions, each of which 
organized meetings with various civil society organizations and gathered the views of ordinary 
members of the public.95 
A full assessment of the balance sheet of the Wise Persons Commission is beyond the scope 
of the article. On the surface, the commission appeared to be an optimal mechanism for ensuring 
that the peace process had a bottom-up dimension and was organically rooted in the aspirations 
and demands of Turkish society. According to one source, while some experts or commissioners 
regarded the commission as generally effective in broadening public participation in the peace 
process and mollifying the concerns of some Turks regarding the process, it was also widely 
faulted for having a mandate that was too short-lived (the commission expired after two months), 
a membership that was too large to issue anything more than lowest common-denominator 
conclusions, and for not being sufficiently representative of society as a whole.96 Başaran (2017) 
is far more critical of the Wise Persons Commission’s performance, asserting that it was an 
exercise in public relations more than anything else.97 In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ben-Ami 
similarly suggests that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was ineffective in rallying public 
opinion and key power centers such as the army bureaucracy behind his peacemaking moves 
towards the Palestinians at the Camp David summit in 2000.98 However, a far more rigorous 
comparative investigation of both conflicts is required with respect to the public opinion 
dimension. 
The monitoring mechanisms (or lack thereof) of each peace process are another aspect of 
the negotiating framework and process that would be useful to examine. A cursory look indicates 
that there was nothing even remotely resembling a rigorous, independent and impartial monitoring 
system in place to hold the conflicting parties accountable, and if warranted, imposes penalties, 
for violations of interim agreements and commitments they made to each other. 
Another compelling line of investigation is to examine in greater depth the relationships 
and interactions between the factors identified in this paper as having contributed to the collapse 
of both peace processes. For instance, the absence of mutual trust between the two parties in each 
conflict may very well have played an influential role in the vagueness of the end goals they 
articulated for the peace negotiations. The logic behind this is that parties to a conflict will be 
reluctant to spell out objectives for ending the conflict that would satisfy the other side if they fear 
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that an untrustworthy adversary will simply “deposit” this as an ironclad commitment and fail to 
reciprocate with something of equal value. For instance, influential voices within the PKK are 
leery of the organization adopting an unequivocal commitment to disarmament for fear that the 
Turkish government will not reciprocate with a credible commitment to end all forms of state 
discrimination against the Kurds, leaving the PKK devoid of any means to combat ill-treatment at 
the hands of the state.99 
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